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15/06/2025
Medio Oriente e Nord Africa

What is at stake between Tel Aviv, Teheran and Washington?

di Francesco Petrucciano

Israel knows Iran perfectly. Believing the Israeli attacks on Iranian soil may represent a boost for Persian civil society to rise against the Ayatollahs’ regime is absurdity to anyone having an even superficial acquaintance to Persian identity: those who are proposing such a reading in Tel Aviv know it is just material to fed Western audience, largely unaware and dramatically unlettered about non-Western contexts.

Israel knows Iran perfectly. Believing the Israeli attacks on Iranian soil may represent a boost for Persian civil society to rise against the Ayatollahs’ regime is absurdity to anyone having an even superficial acquaintance to Persian identity: those who are proposing such a reading in Tel Aviv know it is just material to fed Western audience, largely unaware and dramatically unlettered about non-Western contexts.

The effects of the incumbent confrontation will be exactly the opposite: Persians will circle the wagons and close ranks together with the only class which has a chance to defend the Country, that is the Sepah – also known as Pasdaran, or Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Persian self-consciousness and imperial identity would boost the sense of belonging to the Eranshahr (the Persian imperial identity) and – paradoxically – even those who are in opposition to the regime would entrust the Sepah with embodying the Nation while it is under attack. 

The Sepah is not just military, is much more: invented during – and in relation to – the Revolution started in 1979, they would represent the class dominating the second decade of the life of contemporary Iran, while the first was basically coincident with the war against Iraq and dominated by the clerical élite (which would eliminate any kind of internal opposition during the first years of the conflict together with the Sepah and the newly reformed judicial system).

Wars, in sum, happen to strengthen the regime, at least up to a certain point.

The Sepah website promises harsh retaliations against Israel but only until the attacks continue on Iranian soil: this is of utmost importance. Sepah knows the continuation of the war will be – at the end – beneficial for them in the sense of reaffirming their role and consolidating their control over the Country, jeopardized by the possibility of an eventually working “nuclear agreement” that would reduce their power dramatically because will open the Nation to the world. Therefore, despite the huge damages and the decimation of their top ranks brought by Israeli military, once the conflict is over, the Sepah would end up being stronger than before in internal power matters.

 They seem instead to invite to a moderation. Why?

Nobody prospects anything like a ground invasion by Israel may take place. That would be impossible and bring Israel to financial and military collapse. This means Israel has a specific reading of what is doing right now, and that its actions could be related to some Persian internal and unresolved issues able to bring existential damage to the whole of the Iranian system: that could be the irredentist movement of Southern Azerbaijan.

Azeri are perfectly integrated into both civil society (they represent the main trading class in Iran) and in the very regime: the Supreme Leader himself is of Azeri heritage. Nevertheless, the ideology of Bütöv Azərbaycan (irredentist movement seeking Iranian Azerbaijan secession to join a sort of “Greater Azerbaijan”)is alive and vivid and the relationship between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Iran become extremely difficult, especially after the Azeri Armenian war in 2020. Some even prospected a possible war between the two Countries, and that has much to do with Iranian Azeri province.

Reading the death of Prime Minister Reisi, happened just after a visit to Azerbaijan (a Country with strong ties to Israel), linking that to the famous episode of the electronic devices exploding in Lebanon and comparing that to the modus operandi Israelis are showing recently can shed new lights on Israel role in even Persian internal issues.

Was Israel able to infiltrate Azeri independence movement? Are they now organising them to produce terrorism inside the Country while the attacks are happening, or after? Will we witness internal unrest inside Iran now, related to Azeri independentism, that will be sold to Western audience as a genuine anti-regime revolt, in order to obtain Western audience’s support in further operations against Iran?

And, if so, how would Israel succeed in eventually involving the United States in supporting actions in this sense? The Trump administration is goofily but sincerely trying to get a XIX Century-style non-interventionist stance and gain peace in Eurasia, useful to protect the dollar and try to restore a difficult reindustrialization that will hardly succeed.

The only way for Israel to get success in this and involve the US in the war is pushing them to the need to act: exactly the same situation where we were in 1941: Pearl Harbour was the triggering point to have the US participating to WW2. And today, President Trump said they will retaliate against Iran in case America is under attack: will some American base in – let us say – Iraqi Kurdistan will next casus belli, the new Pearl Harbor?

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